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In this paper, I explore how the probability of a student being in different com-
binations of enrolled/not enrolled and employed/unemployed/not in the labor
force is affected by an increase in the minimum wage. I use binomial logistic
regression, and experiment with both state and county level of observation and
fixed effects. I also use year fixed effects. I find that when either the nominal
or real minimum wage increases, the probability of a student being employed
and enrolled increases, while the probability of being in any of the other groups
decreases. However, these changes are not substantial. I determine that these
results are relatively consistent for both boys and girls. My results are robust
to a variety of specifications. The analyses of gender and real vs nominal wage
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1 Introduction
Dropout rates and the factors that determine them have been an important topic in
education discussions for decades. Although overall dropout rates have declined in
recent years, there is still significant variation between different schools and within
those schools. Understanding this heterogeneity and exploring its probable causes
is thus important when analyzing education policy. The precise causes of a student
dropping out of high school are unique to each individual. Dropout rates vary by gen-
der, race, ethnicity, age, and grade (Stearns et al. 2006). However, many studies have
attempted to generalize about common causes. The forces acting on a student can be
separated into “push” and “pull” factors (Warren and Hamrock 2010). Push factors
are anything that creates an unproductive or unhealthy atmosphere for the student.
Pull factors are any outside incentive to leave school, essentially any component of a
better offer. Intuitively, one of the most important pull factors is the outside wage -
the opportunity cost of school. For most teenagers this is the minimum wage. While
intuitively it makes sense that increases in the minimum wage makes students more
likely to drop out, the opposite could also be true. Students earning a higher wage
could work less without changing their income and thus spend more time on school.
This assumes, however, that they have control over their hours worked and could
increase or decrease to whatever their ideal is. In reality, the situation is much more
complicated. Policies intended to increase high school enrollment are often created to
reduce poverty, and similarly the minimum wage is often claimed as an instrument of
reducing poverty. If the minimum wage decreases enrollment, what then is its effect
on poverty? Is one more important than the other? Which is more helpful? Knowing
whether or not we even have to ask these questions requires understanding whether
the minimum wage and high school enrollment are truly in opposition to each other.
Researchers disagree on whether an increase in the minimum wage leads to higher or
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lower youth employment, and thus on how it affects enrollment or if it does at all.
Consider the following six groups shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The six groups a student can be a part of
In labor force
Not in labor force
Employed Unemployed
Enrolled (1) (3) (5)
Unenrolled (2) (4) (6)
A theoretically logical story could be told for each move between groups (though
some are more likely than others), and thus there is no clear answer or definitive
prediction for the effects of a minimum wage. For example, after a minimum wage
increase, employers may substitute away from high schoolers and towards more skilled
or experienced workers, increasing unemployment. In addition, students may see
the higher returns to labor and drop out of school to pursue these higher rewards,
decreasing enrollment. If these happen at the same time, then the number of teens
both unenrolled and unemployed (group 4) increases. However, it is also possible
that students notice the decrease in available jobs and decide to go back to school,
increasing enrollment. They may even leave the labor force entirely while doing so,
increasing the number of students in group 5. However, it is also possible they become
discouraged while not going back to school, increasing the number of students in group
6. Due to this theoretical ambiguity, empirical analysis is needed to determine overall
effects.
In the following research, I explore how the probability of being in each of these
groups is affected by an increase in the minimum wage, using panel data at the state
and county level from 2009 to 2017. I use binomial logistic regression and a variety
of specifications of the explanatory variables in order to determine the changes in
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probability. I find that for both a nominal or real wage increase, the probability of
a student being employed and enrolled rises while the probability of being in any
of the other groups falls. While these findings are statistically significant, they are
not practically significant as the coefficients are small. These results are robust to
a variety of specifications, including separate estimations by gender. The analyses
of gender and real vs nominal wage are previously unexplored, and mark my main
contributions to the existing literature.
2 Literature Review
There is substantial debate over how an increase in the minimum wage affects teen em-
ployment. Neumark and Wascher (2008) review 53 studies that use state level panel
data, and summarize that almost all of them find statistically significant disemploy-
ment1 effects, using panel data at the state level and state and year fixed effects.
Partridge and Partridge (1998) find not only that a higher minimum wage decreases
teen employment, but that there is a corresponding decrease in labor force participa-
tion (people in or looking for a job) as well. They thus claim that traditional estimates
of employment that do not consider labor force participation underestimate the ef-
fects of an increase in the minimum wage. Couch and Wittenburg (2001) similarly
claim traditional disemployment estimates are understated, citing the same reason.
In order to account for this, I include labor force participation in my estimation.
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011), on the other hand, argue that most disemploy-
ment effects are overstated. They claim the estimates are biased downwards by a
lack of sufficient controls for counterfactual employment trends. They investigate
common models in this body of literature and find that frequently, teen employment
in states that increased their minimum wage was decreasing before the change took
1A reduction in hours worked or a decrease in employment.
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place. They thus argue that there is an endogeneity problem or an issue of con-
fusing correlation with causation in these studies. They replicate the results from
these studies and show that additional controls for the general state of employment
eliminates the significance of these estimates. Allegretto et al. thus finds no effect
on teen employment from a minimum wage. However, Allegretto et al. include both
state-specific year fixed effects and census-division specific year fixed effects, which
are likely highly correlated and thus would reduce the variation in their analysis.
This may be partially responsible for the low level of significance they find. There is
thus still ambiguity about the expected direction of the coefficient for employment of
teens after a minimum wage increase. Some research claims negative estimates are
too strong, while other research finds they are too weak. An estimation strategy that
combines elements of the two groups and accounts for complaints from both sides
would be helpful in determining the true effect. I include both unemployment rates
at my level of observation and labor force participation in my analysis in an attempt
to reconcile these views.
There is even more uncertainty in how enrollment is affected by an increase in the
minimum wage. Several studies look at enrollment and employment simultaneously.
For example, Campolieti et al. (2005) use panel data in Canada to estimate the
probability of being in one of the four combinations of enrolled/employed, as well
as the transitional probabilities of moving between each group. These dependent
variables are at the individual level, which allows them to estimate the transitional
probabilities. Their independent variable is a minimum wage index at the province
level, created by dividing the nominal minimum wage by the average wage. There is
no federal minimum wage in Canada, which has the advantage of creating significant
variation within the nation. They include both province and year fixed effects in
their estimation. They find that in Canada between 1993 and 1999, an increase in
the minimum wage index is associated with a decrease in the probability of teenagers
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being unenrolled and employed. As there are no statistically significant changes for
any other variables, this doesn’t tell us much about what happens. Do they leave
work to go back to school, or are they still unenrolled but now also unemployed? Do
they manage to juggle both after the change, becoming both enrolled and employed?
Their results are ambiguous.
Regardless of the story this estimation tells, the results may not be directly related
to the minimum wage. An increase in the minimum wage index is not necessarily
an increase in the minimum wage. The minimum wage index would also increase if
the minimum wage was constant but average adult wages decreased. Falling average
wages could be a sign of something else going on in the economy that is not related
to the minimum wage. This means that the causal effect claimed in the paper may
be the result of some other force, overstating the impact of the minimum wage. They
do not include any general economy variables (as Allegretto et al. suggest) that could
control for this. Furthermore, “unemployed” is defined in this case as anyone not
employed - there is no distinction between true unemployment (looking for a job)
and being out of the labor force (not looking for a job), which Neumark et al. and
Couch et al. claim is an important nuance. Finally, this situation may simply not
be applicable to the United States due to the many differences in labor laws, school
laws, and other regional characteristics.
Neumark and Wascher (1995) use a similar approach in their research on the United
States. They also consider the probability of being in one of the four combinations of
enrolled/employed, but find an increase in the proportion of students that are neither
enrolled nor employed. This does not necessarily contradict Campolieti et al. - it is
possible that the number of students unenrolled and employed decreases while the
number of students unenrolled and unemployed increases, if students are unable to
find work due to the higher minimum wages but don’t return to school. However,
this may also tell a different story - there were no significant decreases in other
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groups so we don’t know with certainty where this increase came from. Neumark and
Wascher use panel data at the state level to conduct their analysis, and again use a
relative minimum wage. They attempt to control for potential labor trends that could
skew this by including the “prime-age male unemployment rate”, which may not be
fully indicative of the actual unemployment rate. They exclude this control in an
alternative specification, and there is no effect on the estimation. They also control
for state-level variables that could affect enrollment, such as compulsory schooling
laws and teacher salaries. The exclusion of these also does not significantly affect the
coefficients. In general, several alternative specifications show that the results are
robust to a variety of models. I follow a similar empirical strategy as Neumark and
Wascher and Campolieti et al. in my analysis, considering the probability of being in
a certain group. However, I use the minimum wage itself rather than an index.
In a different study entirely, Crofton, Anderson, and Rawe (2009) find that a higher
minimum wage leads to higher dropout rates for Hispanic students, but find no sig-
nificant effect for other groups. This study only looks at Maryland, however, so the
results may not be externally valid. In addition, the authors collect their own data
but do not give details of the process, so selection bias or other data collection errors
are a concern and could bias estimates in either direction. More recent analysis us-
ing more reliable data would be helpful in determining the effects on the proportion
of teens in these different groups. Furthermore, including labor force participation
would provide a more nuanced estimate.
The minimum wage is not the only factor that determines whether or not students
drop out. Push factors, forces that create an inhospitable academic environment, are
also important. If things are worse in school, a higher minimum wage will be more
tempting. Hence, push factors are important to consider when analyzing pull factors
such as the minimum wage. There are three main models explaining push factors:
the frustration self-esteem model (Finn 1989), the participation-identification model
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(Finn 1989), and the social capital model (Stearns et al. 2007). These three models
offer complementary rather than competing explanations, and all help explain the
different factors that can push students out of school. The frustration self-esteem
model describes how children who repeatedly do not do well in school begin to believe
they will never be able to achieve success, discouraging them to the point of dropping
out. There is evidence of this - Jimerson et al. (2002) showed that students who
repeat a grade one or more times are significantly more likely to eventually drop
out. These retained students may lose faith in their academic potential and decide
they would be better off working. Similarly, the participation-identification model
outlines how children who do not feel engaged with their education may lose interest
and motivation until they leave school entirely. Mahoney et al. (1997) shows that
the dropout rate among at-risk students was lower for students who had participated
in extracurricular activities, which supports this. Finally, the social capital model
(Stearns et al. 2007) conceptualizes academic relationships as a resource and argues
that students with fewer connections are more likely to drop out. There are also
push factors that don’t fit neatly into these models. For example, higher graduation
requirements can also cause students to drop out (Lillard et al. 2001; Warren et al.
2006), as fewer students will be able to meet a higher standard.
Different groups are affected heterogeneously by push factors. The most studied
aspect of this is how students of different races are affected. It is well documented
that dropout rates vary significantly by race (Crofton et al. 2009). Additionally,
white and Latino retained students are more likely than Black retained students to
drop out (Bankston and Zhou 2002; Pallas et al. 1990). Multiple studies find that
white students are more likely to participate in extracurricular activities and benefit
academically from this participation (Brown and Evans 2002; Davalos, Chavez, and
Guardiola 1999; Eitle 2005; Eitle and Eitle 2002), which supports the participation-
identification model. Finally, there are persistent differences with respect to academic
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social capital (Crosnoe, Johnson, and Elder 2004; Faircloth and Hamm 2005; McNeal
1999; Ream 2003; Valadez 2002; Yan and Lin 2005). For example, Latino students
may not benefit as much from having teacher and parent based social capital (Ream
2003; Valadez 2002). Moreover, students of color face institutional racism as a push
factor. All of this contributes to push factors and could influence the choice of whether
to stay in school or not.
There is thus substantial debate over how an increase in the minimum wage affects
high school enrollment. In order to understand more exactly what is happening,
an analysis of more than just enrollment or dropout rates is needed. More specific
estimates of effects can help uncover not just whether teens are leaving school but
where they are going, and not just whether they are coming back but why. To this end,
I will use the previously unexplored probability of being in one of the six previously
defined groups (combinations of being in/not in the labor force, enrolled/unenrolled,
and employed/unemployed) as my dependent variable. Since the minimum wage (and
confounding variables) can vary at a substate level, I will be using counties as my unit
of analysis to facilitate a finer analysis. I will also include controls that align with the
participation-identification model, frustration self-esteem model, and social capital
model, such as race and household characteristics. These strategies will allow me to
contribute to the existing literature by examining the relationship between minimum
wage and enrollment in a more detailed way on multiple levels.
3 Theory
3.1 Income and Substitution Effects
The simplest way to conceptualize the opposing effects of minimum wage on en-
rollment is by considering income and substitution effects. If the minimum wage
increases, the opportunity cost of not working rises, so students may choose to work
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more hours. This is the substitution effect. However, if the minimum wage increases,
they can work less and earn the same income, so they may choose to work fewer hours.
This is the income effect. Either one may dominate, meaning that whether a student
works more or fewer hours depends on the preferences of the individual student. If
the income effect dominates, the number of hours spent on school increases. If the
substitution effect dominates, then the number of hours spent on school decreases. If
the change in the number of hours is significant enough, a student may switch from
being enrolled to unenrolled and vice versa.
There are countless reasons why preferences would differ between students. Students
who are struggling more financially, for example, might have a stronger substitution
effect. It could also depend on whether the student prefers working or learning. Thus,
increasing the minimum wage could either increase or decrease high school enrollment,
depending on whether the income or substitution effect dominates overall for the
students in question.
3.2 Human Capital Model
While income and substitution effects are helpful in understanding the choices facing
students, this model says nothing about why students may choose one option or the
other. It hinges on heterogeneous preferences, with no real explanation of how or why
these preferences are different. The human capital model considers this more fully, as
a two-period version of the income/substitution effects framework. The educational
investment model is a part of the human capital model that pertains to educational
attainment, traditionally modeling the differences between high school and college
graduates. Figure 2 below shows the expected trajectory for high school graduates
versus dropouts, before and after the minimum wage change.
This graph shows the possibility that while high school dropouts may have higher
11
Figure 2: High school graduates versus dropouts
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earnings for a time while graduates accumulate costs, eventually graduates will sur-
pass high school dropouts in earnings and make more overall. At the lower minimum
wage, they have a cost a of staying in school and a benefit b. After the minimum
wage increase, the costs of staying in school are higher: they now face a cost of a+ c,
but also an increased benefit b+d. This graph assumes a public school student whose
only cost of school is their lost earnings, rather than a direct cost. It also assumes
that the student who dropped out ends up at the same wage, as a higher starting
wage will likely not last. This may not be the case - their trajectory may be constant,
landing them at a higher end wage. However, the implications are the same regardless
of which occurs.
Human capital accumulation can be modeled using net present value, the difference
between the present value of benefits and the present value of costs, both direct
and indirect. The present value is calculated by discounting future money. Almost
everybody will have a positive discount rate - most people prefer instant gratification
and the present value of income in the current moment declines the longer you have
to wait for it. One possible explanation for differences in preferences is heterogeneity
in discount rates - if two students value the future differently, they will plan for
it differently. This could factor into the decision of whether or not to leave high
school because of a higher minimum wage. If a student heavily discounts the future,
preferring to maximize their current earnings, they may choose to leave school even
though they will earn less overall. Somebody who discounts the future less may choose
to wait, sacrificing current earnings for greater total earnings mostly received in the
future. The human capital model thus predicts different responses based on discount
rates for current versus future income.
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3.3 Sorting and Signaling Model
Another model is the sorting and signaling model, which both competes with and is
complementary to the human capital model, depending on the student. This model
theorizes that although there is an inherent value to human capital accumulation,
this may not be the primary goal of completing high school. Graduating sorts a
student into a higher qualified group, and signals to employers that they should hire
them. This model implies that when the minimum wage increases, if unemployment
increases and thus there are fewer jobs available, teens will stay in school as a way to
differentiate themselves and increase their probability of employment.
Thus, there are a variety of models that could be used to inform hypotheses about the
response of teenagers to an increase in the minimum wage. An empirical framework
is needed to explore this ambiguity further. Following the human capital model,
different responses to a minimum wage increase could be attributed to heterogeneous
discount rates. There is no one hypothesis generated by the human capital model.
In contrast, the sorting and signaling model predicts that when the minimum wage
increases, enrollment will increase and employment and/or participation in the labor
force will decrease.
4 Empirical Strategy
The ideal way to explore the ambiguity in this question would be to randomly assign
minimum wages to students and measure the effect on enrollment. Since this is neither
practical nor ethical, an alternative is to study a city that has increased its minimum
wage in comparison to a similar (ideally statistically identical) city that has not. The
advantage of this method is a relatively reliable conclusion, as the difference between
the treatment and control cities can be estimated before and after the wage change.
14
This quasi-experimental design has greater potential to determine the causal effects
of the minimum wage on enrollment, allowing for more confident interpretation of
coefficients. Numerous papers use this method to study how minimum wage increases
affected employment in Seattle (Jardim et al. 2018; Reich et al. 2017; Jardim 2017),
however these do not consider employment specifically of teens. This is because
the data was taken from a dataset created from information used for unemployment
insurance, which most teenagers do not have. Due to a lack of suitable data, an
experimental approach was not feasible for this project. There was no data available
for teen employment, as explained, or for enrollment either in areas that have recently
had a significant minimum wage or reasonable control areas.
Instead, I use panel data for all 50 states from 2009-2017. I experiment with a
variety of levels - county level data with county fixed effects, state level data with
state fixed effects, and county level data with state fixed effects. These all have
their own advantages and disadvantages. Using a county level gives me a finer unit
of observation and more variation in enrollment and employment. In addition, the
minimum wage occasionally varies at a substate level so there is additional variation
there that a state level fails to account for. However, the majority of the variation
in the minimum wage does occur at the state level, suggesting state fixed effects may
be a better choice. A possible compromise would be to use county observations but
state fixed effects. I run each of these specifications with year fixed effects in order
to compare and contrast the results.
For each of these levels, I run multiple regressions modeling the probability of be-
ing in each of the six groups (each combination of enrolled/unenrolled and em-
ployed/unemployed/not in labor force). I use a binomial logistic regression, which
takes the number of trials as the total number of students and the number of successes
as the number of students in the designated group. This is helpful as the interpreta-
tion can be translated into the probability that an individual student will be in that
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specific group. In addition, it forces the probability to be between 0 and 1, which is
good as it is impossible for the proportion of students in a group to be negative or
greater than 1.
I will use both the real and nominal minimum wage as my independent variable,
in separate specifications. I calculate the real wage using a regional consumer price
index that varies by census level. This includes four sections: Northeast, Midwest,
South, and West. This accounts for some of the regional differences in cost of living
that the nominal minimum wage does not include.
I originally planned to use the seemingly unrelated regression strategy in my esti-
mation, but could not in the end as it is impossible to run with a binomial logistic
regression. This would have run separate regressions (in my case, one for each group)
that are assumed to have correlated error terms (highly likely in my case). It then
would have accounted for this correlation by specifying a covariance matrix for the
error terms. I ran a specification with the dependent variable as a simple proportion
of students in the group both with and without using seemingly unrelated regres-
sions, and find no significant difference. Thus, I feel confident leaving it out of my
final estimation strategy.
I also include various controls in my regression. When I use the state minimum wage
and aggregate the response variable by state, I also use state-level controls. When I
use the county minimum wage and the county response variable, I use county-level
controls. I use the annual unemployment rate as a control, since it is likely that
this will affect the decision for a student to drop out. If there is high unemployment
in general, they may be less confident they can get a job once the minimum wage
increases since that will further reduce jobs. As students make these decisions grad-
ually and at different times, I use the annual average unemployment rate rather the
rate in a particular month. I also control for the population of a county/state. This
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ensures that my results are not driven by changes in population. Additionally, I use
race as a control because different racial groups may respond differently to minimum
wage changes due to heterogeneous push factors 2. Finally, I use the percentage of
households receiving SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, previously
Food Stamps) benefits as a control. This is important to include, because it may
make a large difference on an individual level. If a student receives SNAP benefits,
they may be more likely to go to school and less likely to work as they have greater
food security. As well, SNAP benefits may fall as the minimum wage increases, as
the student or their family earns more and their benefits decrease as a result. Thus,
ignoring this factor may bias the estimates of enrollment downwards. Including the
state or county level rates accounts for some of this individual motivation. All of
these control variables will improve my estimation by removing some of the omitted
variable bias.
I will also be including time fixed effects, which should account for unobserved vari-
ables that are the same for every entity within a given year. These are national
variables that change over time, such as frequently updated federal regulations. Year
fixed effects will control for any macroeconomic condition that affects all counties.
Thus, each of my regressions will follow the basic form below, where Pjit is the
probability of being in group j for an entity i and a year t, MWit is the minimum wage
in that county and year, αi and βt are the entity and year fixed effects (respectively),
and Xit is a vector of controls.
log(
Pit
1− Pit ) = MWit + αi + βt +Xit + it
The entity will either be at the county level, state level, or a combination. The
minimum wage will be either nominal or real. This creates a total of 6 models
2However, I do not have unemployment rates by race.
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(one for each group) and 6 different specifications for each (entity and nominal/real
combination).
5 Data Description
My data on the number of students in each group comes from the American Commu-
nity Survey. This data is only available from 2009 to 2017 inclusive, which sets the
years for my analysis. My data for the minimum wage at a sub-state levels comes
from a 2016 paper by Vaghul and Zipperer, who compiled a list of all the sub-state
minimum wages for each year. Their data is by city and by county - whichever the
official level is. I transformed their data to be at only the county level by assigning
the city minimum wage to the counties within that city, or to the county that con-
tains the city. If both a city and the county containing it or multiple cities within
a county had separate minimum wages, I choose the minimum wage that applies to
the area with the highest population. Thus, the county wage would overrule the city
wage. This will be a relatively accurate transformation, due to the spillover effects
of minimum wage that reach beyond the official boundaries. I manually added the
wage data for 2017, as their paper only goes up to 2016. In order to create a balanced
panel, I remove counties who merge or split over the course of my time period. I also
exclude Washington DC, as it is technically classified as an independent one-county
state yet is within the borders of other counties and states. This creates overlap in
the data, and DC is thus excluded. Finally, I do not include counties who have no
students, or only male or only female students. This takes me from 3142 counties
down to 3120.
There are 107 distinct nominal minimum wages during the considered time period.
The minimum nominal minimum wage during my time period is $6.86, and the max-
imum nominal minimum wage is $15. The mean is $7.51. A density plot for each
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year is shown below in Figure 3; there are clear spikes at common minimum wages,
especially the federal wage (represented by the vertical black line). As various local-
ities increase their minimum wage above the federal level, the density curve flattens
somewhat.
Figure 3: The density of minimum wages for each year
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It is helpful to visualize the variation in the minimum wage at the county level. This
is done below in Figure 4, where color represents the overall change in the nominal
minimum wage between 2017 and 2009.
Figure 4: The change in nominal minimum wage by county
While much of the variation is on a state level (as expected), there is also a fair amount
of county variation. In reality, the spillover effects of the county heterogeneity will be
greater (as nearby counties may increase their wages to better compete), so this map
understates the true variation in wage.
It is also helpful to visualize the real minimum wage, shown below in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: The change in real minimum wage by county
There is less change in the real minimum wage over time. The majority of counties
actually experience a small decrease in the real minimum wage. Much of the variation
that exists is once again on a state level.
Let us now consider general enrollment and employment trends over time. First,
Figure 6 below shows national enrollment compared to the total number of people
aged 16-19. There is a slight increase (about 2 percent) in the proportion of students
who are enrolled.
A similar story can be told for employment of teens 16-19 years old over this time
period. Figure 7 below shows the national employment compared to the total student
population, and although there is a slight decrease, once again the magnitude of the
fall in proportion is small, about 6 percent. This fall is likely due to the Great
Recession.
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Figure 6: Proportion of teens 16-19 years who are enrolled
Figure 7: Proportion of teens 16-19 years who are employed
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If we look now at the probability of being in each separate group (all combinations of
enrolled/unenrolled and employed/unemployed/not in the labor force), we see that
the minimum is 0 and the maximum is 1. This is true for males, females, and the
aggregation of both. This means that for each of these distinctions, there is at least
one county somewhere that has no students in one group and at least one that has all
students in one group. If we consider instead the actual levels (number of students
in each group) rather than probabilities, the minimum is 0 (as explained before) and
the maximum is 203,556. The mean number of students in a group is 421 for males
and 408 for females. The density of the probability of being in each group is shown
below in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Density of the probability of being in each group, aggregated
We can see from this that being both enrolled and employed or enrolled and not in the
labor force are the most common groups, while being not enrolled and unemployed
or not enrolled and employed are the least common, and that students are generally
enrolled.
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We can also see this below in Figure 9 of the probability of being in each group as the
minimum wage changes. The lines represent the smoothed conditional mean, while
the gray outline shows the confidence interval. This plot appears to show that the
probability of being enrolled and not in the labor force increases to a small extent with
the minimum wage, while the probability of being enrolled and employed decreases
to a small extent. We may thus expect this to be reflected in the coefficients of
the estimate. However, the proportions are relatively stable, suggesting that any
significant coefficients will likely be small.
Figure 9: Probability versus minimum wage
6 Results
As outlined in my empirical strategy, I ran 6 specifications of each group model; a
total of 36 regressions. I used binomial logistic regression, which means that each
of the coefficients represented the average increase in the log odds of being in that
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group when the minimum wage increases by one dollar. The transformation between
probability and odds is a monotonic transformation, meaning as the odds increase the
probability increases and vice versa. Thus, we can interpret the sign and significance
of our coefficients relatively simply as the extensive change in probabilities (whether
they increase or decrease, but not by how much).
The results are shown in Tables 1 and 2 at the end of the paper for each of the
six specifications (real and nominal wage for each of county observations with state
fixed effects, state observations with state fixed effects, and county observations with
county fixed effects). Table 1 shows the raw coefficients, while Table 2 shows the
exponentiated coefficients. Coefficients for the controls in each specification are not
listed. Out of 36 total, 32 coefficients are significant at the 1% level, one is significant
at just the 5% level, and three are not significant.
The results are mostly robust to the different choices of county vs state observa-
tions/fixed effects. For each specification, the coefficients on enrolled and employed,
enrolled and unemployed, enrolled and not in the labor force, and unenrolled and un-
employed have the same sign. However, the coefficient on unenrolled and employed is
equally split between positive and negative, with no clear pattern. The coefficient on
unenrolled and not in the labor force is positive for the first five specifications, but is
negative when county fixed effects are used with the real minimum wage.
The choice of nominal or real minimum wage does not seem to affect the sign of the
coefficient - there are only two differences out of all 18 pairs of results. However, the
coefficient for the nominal wage is almost always smaller than the coefficient for the
real wage.
The coefficient on enrolled and employed is positive across all specifications. Sim-
ilarly, the coefficients on enrolled and unemployed/not in the labor force and the
coefficient on unenrolled and unemployed are all negative across specifications. As
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noted previously, the coefficient on unenrolled and employed and the coefficient on
unenrolled and not in the labor force are both sensitive to the specification.
These results imply a situation where some teens who were previously not working
but enrolled are willing and able to find a job after the minimum wage increase.
Similarly, some students who were not working and out of school are able to both get
a job and go back to school when the minimum wage becomes higher.
In addition, the state fixed effects specifications suggest the number of teens who
are neither in the labor force nor in school rises, while the county fixed effects spec-
ifications suggest that this number falls. A positive coefficient weakens the earlier
optimistic interpretation, implying that some of the students who were previously en-
rolled and unemployed/not in the labor force or unenrolled and unemployed became
totally disillusioned. Maybe they dropped out of school to pursue a full-time job and
then became so discouraged by continued unemployment that they stopped looking
without returning to school. A negative coefficient implies the opposite, that teens
are moving from this group to another. Perhaps now it is more worthwhile for them
to work a formal job rather than supporting their family with informal labor, such
as providing childcare for a sibling. County fixed effects account for all variables that
are the same within a county over time. As state fixed effects are mostly a subset of
this group (something that is the same within a state over time is the same within a
county over time), the county fixed effects results are more reliable.
The coefficient on unenrolled and employed also differs depending on the specification.
A positive coefficient may mean that students are dropping out of school to pursue
greater employment and are succeeding in their endeavor. It may also mean that
students who were previously unenrolled but not working now have a job. A negative
coefficient implies the opposite: students who were not in school but working are
either now in school, no longer working, or both. The coefficient is negative when
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county fixed effects are used, or when the nominal minimum wage is used for county
observations with state fixed effects. As before, we lean towards the county fixed
effects coefficient as there is less omitted variable bias.
All of these results together tells a fairly positive story. The coefficient on every
group except enrolled and employed is negative, and the coefficient on enrolled and
employed is positive. Thus, while of course some students will switch between any
two given groups, overall students are both working more and going to school more.
Students who are enrolled and unemployed or not in the labor force may be getting
a job while staying in school. Students who are unenrolled and employed may return
to school, as they can now work fewer hours with the same income and thus have
more time for school. Students who are unenrolled and not working also return to
school, perhaps because they now wish to increase their human capital and/or signal
to employers that they are more qualified in hopes of getting a higher-paying job
later. On the surface, these results may encourage increasing the minimum wage as
the number of students in potentially the most desirable group increases. However,
there is no restriction that the total change must be 0, and thus overall employment
may fall and enrollment may fall if the negative coefficients outweigh the positive.
These results are fairly robust to the different specifications, but are somewhat sen-
sitive to changes in controls. For example, removing the control for population fre-
quently makes the coefficient for enrolled and employed negative rather than positive.
In a similar way, removing other controls one at a time will occasionally flip the sign
of a coefficient in one of the specifications. The magnitude of coefficients will also
change, sometimes as much as 30 standard errors from the original coefficient. As
the coefficients and their standard errors are very small, this is not a huge practical
change in the coefficient, but is still statistically substantial.
My process is fairly effective at predicting the proportion of students in each group.
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I calculated the predicted probability of being in each group in each county and year,
and then subtracted the actual proportion of students in that group in the county. I
then found the average of these residuals for each county, with each group residual
weighted by the total number of students in each group. The results are plotted in
Figure 10 below. For the majority of counties, the average residuals are fairly low,
and there is limited geographic variation apart from a few obvious outliers. These
outliers have very few students arranged in a way that the model does not predict.
Of course, the residuals vary by group model and specification - this is an example
map with an overall view. A complete view would involve 36 different maps, one for
each regression. However, they are relatively similar and this map provides a good
approximation to evaluate the model with.
Figure 10: Average residuals by county
What do these numbers mean in a more practical sense? As noted before, the coeffi-
cients reported in Table 1 can be interpreted as the expected change in log odds from
a one dollar increase in the minimum wage. The exponentiated coefficients in Table
2, ecoef , represents the expected change in the odds ratio from a one dollar increase
28
in the minimum wage. For example, if the coefficient on minimum wage were 0.693,
then the expected change in the odds ratio would be e0.693, or approximately 2. This
represents a doubling of the odds (which does not mean it is twice as likely to hap-
pen). The largest coefficient is -0.179, which corresponds to a e−0.179 = 0.836 change
in the odds ratio, or a reduction of the odds ratio to about 83% of its previous value.
Similarly, the coefficient of 0.145 corresponds to a change in the odds ratio by a factor
of about 1.16. A coefficient of approximately zero would represent no change in the
odds ratio, as e0 = 1. As many of the coefficients in these results lie along these lines,
there is no practical interpretation for much of the results. Although there may be a
statistically significant change, there is no substantial change.
We can also convert these coefficients to probabilities for given values of each variable.
As an example, let us take the median county by teen population size, which is
Stephens County (Georgia) in 2016. Using specification 6, county fixed effects and
the real minimum wage, the predicted probability of a student being both enrolled and
employed is 0.208. If we now keep all other variables constant (at their actual level
for Stephens County in 2016), but increase the real minimum wage by 1 dollar, then
the new predicted probability is 0.229. This is a change of 0.021. Thus, in the median
county, an increase in the real minimum wage of 1 dollar would theoretically increase
the probability of a teen being enrolled and employed by 2.1%. As there are 1404 teens
in 2011, this corresponds to roughly 30 teens. The predicted number of teens who are
enrolled and unemployed decreases by about 4, the predicted number of teens who are
enrolled and not in the labor force decreases by about 26, and the predicted number
of teens in other groups decreases by less than 1. If we use instead an observation with
a number of teens almost exactly equal to the mean number of teens, (Nacogdoches
County, Texas in 2016) then the predicted change in the number of teens in each group
is about 96 for enrolled/employed, -19 for enrolled/unemployed, -95 for enrolled/not
in labor force, -2 for not enrolled/employed, 0 for not enrolled/unemployed, and -2 for
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not enrolled/not in labor force. For both the mean and median county by population
of teens, the changes are not very practically significant. For many counties, there
is no change at all in the number of students in each group. Even for Los Angeles
County in 2011, the observation with the most teenagers, there is a change of less than
1 for the group of students that are unenrolled and unemployed, and the changes for
unenrolled/employed and unenrolled/not in the labor force are both less than 2. Thus,
although these results are statistically significant, they are not practically significant
for the majority of counties at the level of common minimum wage increases, which
are often less than a dollar (especially in real terms).
7 Gender Considerations
So far, only aggregate groups of students have been considered. It is possible, however,
that boys and girls have different responses to an increase in the minimum wage. This
is previously unexplored, so I expand my research to consider this possibility. In this
section, I explore the theory and then repeat my empirical analysis separately for
boys and girls in order to compare them.
Considering the role of gender in the human capital model, it is possible that women
may discount the future more. For example, women may anticipate shorter, more
disrupted work lives than men (Rosburg 2010). Discontinuous workers of this kind ex-
perience lower returns on investment (Rosburg 2010), which could discourage women
from investing as much. There are other reasons women may choose to invest less
in their human capital. Women with lower expected future labor force participation
may choose lower-skill jobs (Rosburg 2010). Societal discrimination can also cause
differences: students facing discrimination will have less incentive to invest in their
human capital and may be more likely to drop out (Rosburg 2010). However, it is also
possible that women value human capital investment more, on average. This would
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be reflected in higher dropout rates for boys than girls, which is in fact what we see
(ChildTrends). If women discount the future more, they may be more likely to drop
out when the minimum wage increases. If women value human capital investment
more, they may be less likely to drop out when the minimum wage increases.
Using the sorting/signaling model instead, it is possible that women will be less
likely to sort themselves into the higher category. If, as before, they perceive greater
barriers to employment than their male counterparts they may not try as hard to
get a job. However, they may also be more motivated to reach a higher standard
because of these obstacles and thus stay in school more than boys. Finally, there may
be family-level variables that cause girls to drop out of school - higher expectations
for taking care of siblings or unsupported adolescent parenting, for example. Thus,
the predictions for the differences between girls and boys are ambiguous - the theory
doesn’t point to one clear direction or even that there will be a difference.
We can see from the plots below that the latter is likely. There is no obvious difference
between the two relationships that we might expect to see reflected in the estimations.
When the regressions are run, we see that this is mostly the case. The results are
shown in Tables 3 and 4 for boys and Tables 5 and 6 for girls. There is no substantial
difference in how the minimum wage affects boys and girls when it comes to the
probability of being in one of these six groups. In fact, with the exception of the
last two groups (unenrolled and either unemployed or not in the labor force), each
regression has the same implication as those in the aggregate results. The sign and
significance of the coefficients is the same, again with the exceptions of the last two
groups. The coefficients are not persistently larger for either group compared the the
other.
For the aggregate group of students and only males, the coefficient on being unenrolled
and unemployed is always negative. For females, however, it is always positive and
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Figure 11: Trends of probability versus minimum wage, for males
Figure 12: Trends of probability versus minimum wage, for females
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is not significant for one of the specifications. This implies that girls are more likely
to switch into the unenrolled/unemployed category than boys are. This could be due
to labor market discrimination - perhaps it is harder for high school girls to get a
job if employers are now being more selective due to higher wages. For the group of
students who are unenrolled and not in the labor force, the coefficients for only females
mostly align with the aggregate coefficients. The coefficients for males, however, do
not. Their state level specifications have negative coefficients rather than positive,
and one of them is not significant. This implies that boys are somewhat less likely
than girls to switch into this category. This makes sense, as girls often have more
demands on their time for informal labor such as childcare (not counted as being in
the labor force by the American Community Survey).
8 Conclusion
My results on the effect of a minimum wage increase on the probability of being in
one of six enrollment/employment groups are somewhat ambiguous, as there is no
certain interpretation (switches between groups are implied by overall results, and
may not be accurate) and my results vary by specification. Overall, however, I find
statistically significant results that are not practically substantial. Some of my results
support the previous literature, while others appear to contradict common findings.
For the specifications with county fixed effects and the specification with county obser-
vations, state fixed effects, and the nominal minimum wage I find that the probability
of being unenrolled and employed decreases, as Campolieti et al. do. However, all
other specifications show an increase in this probability. As I trust the county fixed
effects specifications above the others, my findings adhere to those of Campolieti et
al. In direct opposition to Neumark and Wascher, I find that the probability of being
unenrolled and unemployed decreases unambiguously for males and for the aggre-
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gated groups. My results for females differ for some of the specifications, matching
their results. The main findings of the two papers most similar to mine deal only
with the groups where I find ambiguous results, and as such it is hard to determine
whether my results confirm or contradict theirs. Although sign and significance are
ambiguous, in any case the coefficients are not practically significant either way. The
change of positive to negative generally comes down to whether a group gains a few
students or loses a couple. This does unambiguously contrast with these papers, who
find more substantial results. In addition, I also find statistically significant changes
in the probability of being in other groups, which they do not.
There are multiple explanations for these differences, which coordinate rather than
compete with each other. Most glaringly is the fact that neither of these papers uses
the actual minimum wage. Instead, they use an index that is scaled by the average
wage during a given year. As discussed in the literature review, this may skew their
results in either direction. At any rate, their independent variable is fairly different
than mine, which could easily create differences in results. When my minimum wage
increases (both real and nominal), it is possible that their minimum wage also in-
creases. If the average wage falls as a result (for example because of disemployment
effects), or if the minimum wage was increased precisely as a result of falling aver-
age wages, then their index may increase more than the actual minimum wage. If,
however, the average wage rises when the minimum wage rises (obviously possible,
as many people are now earning more), then their index may increase less than the
actual minimum wage. This may vary by region, causing very different variation in
the minimum wage than I use, for both real and nominal. Furthermore, both of the
papers are from a while ago and one of them is from another country. It is entirely
possible that their results simply are not externally valid to the context I explore in
my research. Similarly, none of the earlier papers consider the same six groups that I
do. I find that the inclusion of labor force participation was helpful, as the direction
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of results for unemployed vs not in the labor force was occasionally different. Not
including this nuance would pull your estimate in two directions, potentially erasing
any significance. This is another possible reason for the differing results I find.
In addition, the inclusion of gender is previously unexplored. I run my analysis
separately for boys, girls, and the aggregate in order to compare relationships. My
findings do not vary substantially by gender - boys and girls react similarly to a
change in the minimum wage.
My research has limitations that must be discussed. Most glaringly, there is omitted
variable bias present. The factors that cause a student to be in one of these groups
are, as we saw in the literature, hugely varied and dependent on each individual.
Many of them are outside the student’s control, and most of them are unobservable
characteristics such as internal motivation. As I use only county level data, my anal-
ysis cannot account for these important factors. They may affect my estimation if
they are correlated with the overall response to the minimum wage. In addition, I do
not know who transferred groups, which would be instrumental in drawing conclu-
sions about the effect of a minimum wage. Individual level data would be ideal for
this topic, while I only have aggregate numbers with no idea about who makes them
up. Another limitation is that my state and year fixed effects cannot account for
important variables such as local labor laws that may in fact prohibit many students
from entering the group they would otherwise like to be in, or misreport their status
if they are working under the table. Moreover, misreporting is a serious concern in
any case, as my data for the dependent variable comes solely from surveys, which are
likely to be inaccurate in some way.
Overall, however, my findings reasonably fill a gap in the literature. I show that
the effects on enrollment and employment of teenagers is similar for real and nominal
increases. I explore the gender aspect and find that there is no clear difference. My
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findings about the changes in the probability of being in each group contribute to the
understanding of how students react to a change in the minimum wage in a variety of
relevant ways, most significantly that students do move into the group that is both
enrolled and employed, but the change is not substantial. Potential future work could
involve accounting for the correlation between the errors of the group models, which
may further inform the conclusions of this research.
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